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Abstract 
	 This thesis is a comparative study on the Taiwanese and Hong Kongese independence 
movements. Structured by social movement theory, this study focuses on how each movement evolved 
after a central cause and focuses on the different components of  the social movements. This paper also 
includes an analysis on “national pride” in Taiwan and Hong Kong, tested by using SPSS and data from 
Asian Barometer. 
	 The two independence movements can both be understood through its supporters’ concerns, and 
in both cases, identity is described as something culturally distinct from the mainland. As for determining 
“national pride,” my analysis indicates that, in 2010, Taiwanese people with higher social class and people 
over 50 were more proud to be Taiwanese. As for Hong Kongese people in 2012, males, people over 50 
and people with lower social status were more proud to be Chinese. 
	 In regards to political opportunity, the Taiwanese independence movement’s opportunity for 
collective action has contracted on an international scale, but has expanded locally. In Hong Kong, the 
“failure” of  the Umbrella Movement, as well as mainland China’s reaction to the movement, led to the 
creation of  many new pro-independence or pro-localist political parties. By seeking positions in the 
legislative body, Hong Kong’s independence supporters have attempted to create political opportunity for 
themselves. 
	 In conclusion, this thesis can add to the conversation about sovereignty and democracy in East 
Asia. This thesis can further shed light to how the Chinese government should conduct relations with both 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. If  gaining Taiwan is still important to the People’s Republic of  China, then I 
suggest that they must first win Hong Kong people’s hearts. 
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I. Introduction 
	 “Taiwan is not a part of  China. Taiwan is Taiwan”; “Hong Kong is Hong Kong.” In recent years, 
cries of  protest like those above could be heard from pro-independence and pro-democracy supporters in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. These protests remain relevant today. Recently, some Hong Kongers protested 
the election of  Beijing-backed Carrie Lam as the Chief  Executive-designate of  Hong Kong on March 
26th, 2017. Using images such as umbrellas that allude to the 2014 Umbrella Movement, protestors 
shouted, “We want real universal suffrage!”  In Hong Kong, one in six people now support independence 1
from mainland China,  while around 90 percent of  the population in Taiwan would identify themselves as 2
“Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese.”  Since the outbursts of  the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and 3
the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, news of  these independence protests have caught international 
observers’ attention. Because the People’s Republic of  China wants to use Hong Kong as an example of  
the “one country, two systems” model it hopes to one day implement in Taiwan, the mainland may try 
harder to enforce their control over the Hong Kongese protests. Understanding both of  these 
independence movements is important for mainland government to resolve its issues with both Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. 
	 Taiwan and Hong Kong are two small territories located in close proximity to mainland China, 
who claims sovereignty over them both. In the People’s Republic of  China, Taiwanese and Hong Kongese 
identity are sensitive topics. For example, journalist David Volodzko discusses his experience when asking 
mainlanders about the three sensitive topics—Taiwan, Tibet and Tiananmen: “I…soon grew used to  
 Wu, Venus, and James Pomfret. "Hong Kong Protest Leaders Charged Day after New Leader Chosen." 1
Reuters, 27 Mar. 2017. Web. 29 Mar. 2017.
 Baldwin, Claire, Sharon Shi, and Ben Blanchard. "One in Six Support Hong Kong Independence from 2
China: Poll." Reuters, 25 July 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2017.
 Nylander, Johan. "Strong Support For Independence In Taiwan." Forbes Magazine, 15 Feb. 2015. Web. 28 3
Mar. 2017.
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hearing the same replies. Tibet belongs to China. Taiwan belongs to China.”  The sensitivity of  the topic 4
of  Taiwan, in particular, can be reflected recently in the response of  the Chinese government to President 
Donald Trump receiving President Tsai Ing-wen’s call; the Chinese government called on the U.S. 
government to deny the Taiwanese president’s entry to the United States.  5
	 Taiwan and Hong Kong’s political history reveals many similarities that make the two places 
interesting to study; besides the fact that mainland China claims both places, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
both experienced a colonial past that promoted a sense of  identity different from their common ethnic 
Chinese identity. While supporters of  independence in both places state that reasons for their protests 
include social and political rights, they mainly protest for the right to rule themselves.  
	 A comparative analysis reveals how identity can be reflected in both independence movements 
and the politics of  independence movements. Additionally, it will focus on how each movement frames its 
identity and utilizes politics for its goals. Structured by social movement theory, this study focuses on how 
each movement evolved after a central cause. For example, while the Taiwanese independence movement 
developed because of  the KMT’s oppressive regime, the Hong Kongese independence movement is based 
on social and economic problems that occurred after the 1997 handover. 
	 Independence movements, such as the ones in Hong Kong and Taiwan, can be described as social 
movements. Scholars have varying definitions for social movements. However, scholar Mario Diani states 
that most definitions include “a network of  informal interactions between a plurality of  individuals, 
groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of  a shared collective 
identity.”  Scholars believe that social movements can be split into four categories: alternative, redemptive, 6
reformative and revolutionary. In the case of  Taiwan and Hong Kong’s independence movements, these  
 Volodzko, David. "China's Biggest Taboos: The Three Ts." The Diplomat, 23 June 2015. Web. 2 Mar. 4
2017.
 Phillips, Tom. "China Asks US to Block Taiwan President Trip after Talk of  Donald Trump Meeting." 5
The Guardian, 6 Dec. 2016. Web. 2 Mar. 2017.
 Diani, Mario (1992). "The concept of  social movement". The Sociological Review. 40 (1): p.13. Print.6
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movements can be described as “reformative,” because both have been split into political parties, meaning 
that independence supporters have agreed to work with their opposition.  For example, in the 1990s, 7
Taiwanese independence supporters “traded its original strategy of  violent protests for a strategy of  
electoral competition.”  8
	 Scholars have devised several theories to explain the emergence of  independence movements. For 
Taiwan, mass society theory and status inconsistency can be used to explain the rise of  discontent against 
KMT rulers and the creation of  the independence movement after 1949. Mass society theory refers to 
“the absence of  an extensive structure of  intermediate groups through which people can be integrated 
into political and social life.”  As for status inconsistency theory, this means that unequal status “promotes 9
dissonance.”  The KMT’s strict government and social control contributed to feelings of  alienation. 10
When the KMT government came to power in the late 1940s, KMT leaders not only had to protect 
Taiwan from threats across the strait, but they also had to keep make sure that Taiwanese subjects did not 
criticize their government. As a result, the regime restricted civil and political activities and censored 
newspapers.  The KMT government also carried out land reform that forced local landlords to hand 11
over property so that new government property could be built, and television hosts were forced to speak 
“clumsy” Mandarin.  Before long, the Taiwanese realized the people from the mainland were actually  12
 “Types of  Social Movements.” Boundless Sociology, 20 Sep. 2016. Web. 28 Mar. 2017.7
 Yeh, Chieh-Ting. "‘Taiwan Independence’ Doesn’t Mean What You Think." Foreign Policy, 11 Apr. 2016. 8
Web. 27 Mar. 2017.
 McAdam, Doug. Political Process and the Development of  Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. Chicago, Ill.: University 9
of  Chicago, 1982, p.7. Print.
 Ibid, p.8.10
 Harrison, Mark. Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of  Taiwanese Identity, New York: Palgrave 11
Macmillan, 2006, p.39. Print.
 Ibid.12
3
new colonizers.  Authors Cheng-Feng Shih and Mumin Chen state that “by wielding military 13
suppression, political domination and cultural hegemony, the KMT helped crystallize the native identity, 
which led to anti-mainlander ethnic nationalism.”   14
	 In Hong Kong, social discontent and the emergence of  the independence movement can be 
perhaps explained as a reaction to social and economic change after the handover of  Hong Kong to the 
mainland, or as collective behavior theory. Collective behavior theory explains that “any severe social 
strain can provide the necessary structural antecedent for movement emergence.”  Movements can be 15
caused from a “disruption in the normal functioning society,” examples are industrialization, urbanization, 
or a rapid rise in unemployment.  Author Shiu Hing Lo states that the “reliance on the economic 16
strategy of  closer integration with Mainland China under the Tsang administration sowed the seeds of  
social and economic discontent in the young generation,” and that the influx of  visitors from 2003 to 2013 
caused Hong Kong people to dislike mainlanders, who have been “daily smuggling goods and products 
across the border, leading to increases in the prices of  local products, ranging from tooth paste to milk 
powder.” This also resulted in some Hong Kong people even arguing that the number of  tourists should 
be controlled.  17
	 This analysis fills a lacuna in scholarship on the comparison of  the two independence movements. 
So far, no in-depth comparison of  Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s independence movements exists with the 
employment of  social movement theory. Social movement theory attempts to explain how and why social 
movements form and identify the possible success of  social movements, and can be divided into several  
 Shih, Cheng-Feng, and Mumin Chen. "Taiwanese Identity and the Memories of  2-28: a case for 13
Political Reconciliation,” Asian Perspective 34.4, Special Issue on Seeking Political Reconciliation: Case 
Studies in Asia (2010): p.95. Print.
 Ibid, p.98.14
 McAdam, Political Process and the Development, p.8.15
 Ibid.16
 Lo, Shiu Hing. Hong Kong's Indigenous Democracy: Origins, Evolution and Contentions, England: Palgrave 17
Macmillan, 2015, p.89. Print.
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parts: identity and framing, political opportunity, and success, as examples. This theory helps frame this 
study by providing analytical categories for interpreting evidence. It can be used to identity and explain 
the various components of  the independence movements’ development. 
	 This paper will be divided into two main chapters: one focused on identity and framing,  the other 
on political opportunity and strategies. The first chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will focus 
on identity and framing, while the second part concerns “citizenship,” or national pride, in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. I use SPSS and survey data from AsianBarometer to answer the question: “How proud are 
you to be a citizen of  Taiwan/China [Hong Kong]?” The second chapter will discuss political 
opportunity, as well as the strategies for independence supporters. This paper will answer questions such 
as “What does it mean to be called ‘Taiwanese’ or ‘Hong Kongese?’” This paper also addresses questions 
such as, “Where have these concerns about China come from?” This paper has found that both 
Taiwanese people and Hong Kongese people feel a disconnect towards their ancestors on the mainland. 
Both movements also attempt to frame their goals in a way that advocates for local people ruling 
themselves. Political opportunity is already available in Taiwan by their government under DPP power, 
while in Hong Kong, people have attempted to create political opportunity for themselves, with the 
creation of  political parties. In both places, identity and cultural productions have been used as protest 
strategy. 
	 The first body chapter will analyze identity and framing in social movements. Social movements 
must create a collective identity. This identity is described as “an individual’s cognitive, moral, and 
emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution.”  Collective identity is 18
a part of  movement ‘frame,’ “the interpretive packages that activists develop to mobilize potential 
adherents and constituents.”  These ‘frames’ “make a compelling case for the ‘injustice’ of  the condition  19
 Polletta, Francesca and James M. Jasper, “Collective Identity and Social Movements,” Annual Review of  18
Sociology, Vol. 27 (2001), p.285. Print.
 Ibid, p.291.19
5
and the likely effectiveness of  collective ‘agency’ in changing that condition.”  Social movements also 20
“make clear the ‘identities’ of  the contenders, distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘them’ and depicting antagonists as 
human decision makers.”  Additionally, collective identity may be “first constructed by outsiders.” The 21
group may then choose whether to accept this identity.  This reflects, in part, Prasenjit Duara’s research, 22
when he concludes that “identity is a form of  meaning that only becomes possible with the differentiation 
between two possible identities.”  23
	 The next part of  the thesis will discuss the “politics” and “political opportunity” of  the 
independence movements. This chapter will address the political opportunity structures and collective 
behavior in both Taiwan and Hong Kong. This section will examine the capacity to act collectively and 
the political opportunity available to protestors in regards to Taiwan and Hong Kong’s independence 
movements. Political opportunity is described by Peter Eisinger as “the degree to which groups are likely 
to be able to gain access to power and manipulate the political system,”  while political opportunity 24
structure has been described as the “importance of  the broader political system in structuring the 
opportunities for collective action,”  or the “safe space” available for political mobilization. Examples of  25
opportunity structures include “the nature of  political cleavages, institutional structures, alliance 
structures, and prevailing strategies of  social movements.”  Social movements also largely develop in 26
democracies.  27
 Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and…,” p.291.20
 Ibid.21
 Ibid, p.285.22
 Harrison, Making of  Taiwanese Identity, p.29. 23
 Eisinger, P.K. “The Conditions of  Protest Behavior in American Cities,” American Political Science Review, 24
67(1) (1973), p.33. Print.
 Liu, Michel, Kim Geron, and Tracy Lai. The Snake Dance of  Asian American Activism: Community, Vision, and 25
Power, Lanham: Lexington, 2008, p.8. Print.
 Meyer, David S. "Protest and Political Opportunities." Annual Review of  Sociology 30 (2004): p.131. Print.26
 Tily, Charles. Social Movements 1768-2004, Boulder: Paradigm Press, 2004, p.33. Print.27
6
	 Governments can affect the political opportunity structure available to the movement. Gary Marx 
discusses possible repressive actions governments may take. He mentions “the creation of  an unfavorable 
public image, disinformation, restricting a movement’s resources and limiting its facilities, de-recruitment 
of  activists, destroying leaders, fueling international conflicts, encouraging conflicts between groups, and 
sabotaging particular actions.”  One way in which a government might also restrict social movements is 28
through policing protests. Researcher Donatella della Porta argues that “the legitimacy of  the state, that is, 
the citizens’ moral approval of  the state’s authority, is an important dimension of  opportunity.”  She 29
adds, the “loss of  legitimacy puts a regime at a disadvantage in the contest for framing issues in a crisis, 
leads to a rapid erosion of  the regime’s authority, and weakens the loyalty of  social control agents.”  30
Similar actions like those mentioned above can be reflected in the mainland government’s reaction to the 
Hong Kongese protest. For example, political activists critical of  the mainland government have reported 
feeling as if  they are are being watched. Additionally, under the pressure of  the central government, 
mainland-biased Hong Kongese media characterized the 2014 Umbrella Movement protests as “violent,” 
forcing independence supporters to rely on “alternative media,” such as Facebook and Twitter, to voice 
their concerns.  31
	 As previous research suggests, social movement organizations will sustain abeyance structures 
during periods of  “limited political opportunities,” which means that identities, “nurtured within” social  
 Marx, Garl. “External Efforts to Damage or Facilitate Social Movements: Some Patterns, Explanations, 28
Outcomes, and Complications” in The Dynamics of  Social Movements, Winthrop Publishers, 1979, p.41. 
Print.
 Porta, Donatella della. “Social movements and the state: Thoughts on the policing of  protest,” in 29
Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. 
Cambridge, UK: 2008, p.43. Print.
 Ibid.30
 Kwong, Ying-Ho. "Dynamics of  Mainstream and Internet Alternative Media in Hong Kong." 31
Department of  Government and Public Administration at the Chinese University of  Hong Kong, December 2015, p. 274. 
Print.
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movement networks, “contribute to the spillover effect from one movement to another.”  As a result of  32
this, the continuation of  a social movement can be produced when supporters join different organizations, 
that advocate for different, but relevant goals. An example of  this can be seen in Taiwan, when the localist 
movement of  the 1970s became a part of  the independence movement.  33
	 The next section discusses the strategies and organization of  the two independence movements. 
There are multiple strategies for protest, one example being “disruptive,” in which groups use violence to 
reach their means.  Authors Zald and McCarthy mention “radical flank effects,” the way in which groups 34
may benefit from the presence of  a “radical wing.” This presence of  extremists “encourage funding of  the 
moderates as a way of  undercutting [the extremists] influence.”  In Hong Kong and Taiwan, there are 35
many “radical,” localist organizations supporting independence. This has perhaps allowed for the 
successful election of  “moderates.” 
	 Strategies must be developed to frame issues with the purpose of  influencing or making changes 
to the social or political environment. However, organizers can also make strategic efforts to reframe the 
movement’s own identity. Krestschmer suggests, “through framing their identities and beliefs…
organizations attempt to balance insider and outsider status with claims specifically designed to appeal to 
both the broader public and the narrow identity of  institutional members.”  The author also explains 36
that these organizers “deliberately construct identities that conflict with institutionalized ideas about what 
those identities should be.”  Framing can also play an important role in sustaining member  37
 Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and…,” p.297.32
 Tischer, Jacob. "Orphan of  Asia – Taiwan and the Impossibility of  the Taiwanese." Powision, Web. 3 33
Mar. 2017. 
 Gurr, Ted Robert. Violence in America, Newbury Park: Sage, 1989, p.339. Print.34
 McAdam, Doug, John David McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: 35
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. Cambridge, UK: 2008, p.14. Print.
 Kretschmer, Kelsy. "Contested Loyalties: Dissident Identity Organizations, Institutions, and Social 36
Movements,” Sociological Perspectives 52.4 (2009): p.434. Print.
 Ibid.37
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participation.  Organizers can concentrate on “recasting constituents’ identities to include participation 38
as one of  the responsibilities or benefits of  group membership.”   39
	 Other important strategies for success includes the relationship of  social movements to other 
groups, the dependence of  movements upon external support, such as political influence, and the response 
to tactics used by authorities to control movements.  Organizers may also make “efforts to shape the 40
broader political environment,” which can “influence the overall pace and outcome of  the struggle.”  41
Additionally, media can be used as a strategy to create social attention. Media can be used as a way to 
evoke emotional response and can be used to attract people to participate in their cause.  This paper will 42
attempt to broadly explain the strategic and organizational aspects of  the movements, by first discussing 
how these movements are organized, how these movements utilize identity and resources and how these 
organizers use media or cultural production to promote their cause.  
	 The final section of  this paper will attempt to determine the success of  Taiwan and Hong Kong’s 
independence movements, and it will identify the components of  movement survival, as indicated by the 
change in politics and political opportunity in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The organizational goal of  a 
social movement is continuation, so social movement organizers will often produce materials that “operate 
to bind individuals to social movement organizations and hence, serve to provide continuous 
involvement.”  Social movements can “survive” in the way that they impact society. The way in which 43
the political opportunity structures have changed in Hong Kong and Taiwan reflect their success.  
 Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and…,” p.30. 38
 Ibid.39
 McCarthy, John D. and Zald, Mayer N. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 40
Theory.”The American Journal of  Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 6. May 1977, p.1213. Print.
 McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, p.13.41
 Hayes, Darrel C., Jerry A. Hendrix, and Pallavi D. Kumar. Public Relations Cases, Australia: Wadsworth 42
Cengage Learning, 2013, p.99. Print.
 Zald, Mayer N., and John D. McCarthy. "Social Movement Industries: Competition and Cooperation 43
Among Movement Organizations,” Aug. 1973, p.1227. Print.
9
	 In social movements, changing identities can also be considered a primary movement goal.  44
Social movements “need to be integrated with injustice and agency frames so as to clearly distinguish ‘us’ 
from opponents and bystanders,”  and these frames developed within movements “may have lasting 45
impact on institutional political arenas and organizational forms.”  Social movements may then 46
“demonstrate to elites that society must change to accommodate the movement.”  Polletta and Jasper 47
state that, social movements, in the way that they demand recognition of  a new identity, can both “secure 
concessions and permanently change the terrain of  political conflict.”  A change in the identity of  a 48
society or a change in the political terrain can be an indicator of  movement success. 
	 Societal or political impact indicates the success of  movements, however, social movements can 
also fail. Many factors can lead to the failure of  a social movement. One of  the biggest reasons for social 
movement failure is a break in collective identity, which must be preserved, so that supporters of  a social 
movement will continue to donate their time and resources to the cause of  the movement. Social 
movements can also fail in the strategies that they may pursue. ‘Challenging groups,’ groups “whose goals 
required the ‘displacement’ of  their opponents,” can also fail.  Additionally, groups with multiple goals 49
will be more likely to survive or be successful, because they can continue to advocate for change after their 
first goal is achieved.  50
	 In conclusion, this analysis reveals the differences between each independence movement.  Both 
independence movements carry themes of  self-governance, or of  local people ruling themselves. However,  
 Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and…,” p.296.44
 Ibid, p.292.45
 Ibid, p.297.46
 Zald, Mayer N., and John D. McCarthy. Social Movements in an Organizational Society: Collected Essays New 47
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publ., 2003, p.340. Print.
 Polletta et al., “Collective Identity and…,” p.297.48
 McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, p.15.49
 Ibid.50
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while both movements are inherently against mainland China, the Taiwanese independence movement is 
often misunderstood by U.S. policy makers, international media and China, itself—the Taiwanese 
independence organizers’ original intention was to form a government separate from the the KMT. While 
the Taiwanese believe that they are already “de facto” independent, the Hong Kongese do not hold this 
kind of  belief. Understanding these independence movements is crucial for mainland China, because in 
order for it to solve its problem with Taiwan, it must first solve their problem with Hong Kong.  
11
II. Identity and Framing 
A. Framing of  the independence movements 
Social movements must create an identity for its supporters. This identity is a part of  movement 
‘frame,’ or the way in which movements advertise themselves and their cause. As movements evolve, 
organizers can later develop frames that appeal to the broader public. This identity may be reflected in the 
movement’s cultural productions. 
	 In both Hong Kong and Taiwan, people feel a cultural disconnect towards mainlanders. While 
Hong Kong identity can be expressed as a cultural mix of  East and West, the Taiwanese have called 
themselves the “Orphan of  Asia,” a term describing foreign countries’ abandonment of  Taiwan in recent 
history and Taiwan’s “dissociation from the larger global community, in general.”  Both movements also 51
attempt to frame their goals through democratic values. However, they ultimately advocate for local 
people ruling themselves.
Taiwanese identity and the Taiwanese independence movement
	 Local identity in Taiwan has existed long before KMT’s arrival on Taiwan. In his book, Legitimacy, 
Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of  Taiwanese Identity, author Mark Harrison makes the argument that 
Taiwanese identity “has existed for as long as Taiwan has had a name.”  Because of  historical 52
controversy, however, Taiwanese identity, as being different from Chinese identity, is seen as illegitimate on 
the mainland.  
	 Recently, with Taiwan’s election of  DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen, the mainland has become more 
worried about the future of  the mainland’s relationship with Taiwan. During Tsai’s presidential term, it is 
likely that Taiwan will pursue the course of  “identity politics,” or politics with the “aim to secure the 
political freedom of  a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context.”  Chu argues that  53
 Ching, Leo T. S. Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of  Identity Formation. Berkeley: U of  51
California, 2001, p.180. Print.
 Harrison, Making of  Taiwanese Identity, p.60.52
 "Identity Politics". Stanford Encyclopedia of  Psychology. 23 April 2015. Web.53
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when those seeking political legitimacy invoke national identity, but their efforts are insufficient, then this 
can lead to the creation of  identity politics.  Chu states that identity ambiguity, “complicated by [the] 54
KMT’s failure to define a new national identity” after their arrival in Taiwan, gave rise to the use of  
Taiwanese identity politics.  Chu personally believes that Taiwan’s national identity is a “reflection of  the 55
lack of  national self  confidence” from “cultural uncertainty in the face of  Chinese nationalism.”  With 56
the DPP in power, the mainland should expect politicians to “emphasize Taiwanese nationalism and the 
notion of  a Taiwan that is politically and culturally distinct from mainland China,”  or to enact identity 57
politics. 
	 The colonization of  Taiwan has led to the development of  cultural identities that differ from the 
mainland. The Dutch, the Japanese and the Chinese, the Spanish are all examples of  Taiwan’s previous 
colonizers. Many Taiwanese people believe Japan has made significant contributions to Taiwan’s 
development,  but the ideas relevant to the establishment of  an independent Taiwan developed during 58
Japanese occupation. Joshua Liao, one inventor of  Taiwan’s independent theory, describes Formosa as “a 
small and weak Taiwan overwhelmed by the power of  the Japanese empire, and though experiencing 
industrial development, doing so for the benefit of  the Japanese rather than the Taiwanese.”  With the 59
defeat of  the first Sino-Japanese War and the 1895 “Treaty of  Shimonoseki,” authority over Taiwan was 
transferred from the Qing Empire to Japan. In 1945, after Japan’s defeat in WWII, the Allies made a deal 
with Chiang Kai-shek to transfer the authority of  Taiwan from Japan to Chinese nationalists, or the  
 Chu, Jou-Juo. "Nationalism and Self-determination: The Identity Politics in Taiwan,” African and Asian 54
Studies 35.3 (2000): p.305.Print.
 Ibid, p.304.55
 Ibid.56
 Casey, Michael. "Time to Start Worrying about Taiwan." The National Interest, 12 June 2016. Web. 23 57
Apr. 2017.
 Harrison, Making of  Taiwanese Identity, p.88.58
 Ibid.59
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KuoMinTang (KMT), who retreated to Taiwan in 1945, during the Chinese Civil War.  Researcher Jacob 
Tischer makes this statement about the origin of  a separate-Taiwanese-identity in Taiwan: “Although 
made possible by political liberalization since 1987, full-scale Taiwanization has its socio-political forbears 
in the literary indigenization movement of  the 1970s, with roots as far back as the collective experience of  
Japanese colonization.”  Before the transfer of  Taiwan from Japan to the KMT government, the 60
Taiwanese independence movement was already brewing. 
	 For the past half  century, Taiwanese identity can be explained by one piece of  literature—the 
Orphan of  Asia.  Author Ching describes the importance of  this novel, in relation to the development of  61
Taiwanese identity: “The notion of  an orphan, of  being abandoned, of  not belonging, has become a 
powerful metaphor in thinking about and defining the modern history of  Taiwan.”  Ching adds, “It is 62
this conflicted sense of  anger and lament that constitutes Taiwan’s collective psychic formation and 
enables the Taiwanese to eulogize their ‘national’ history as one of  betrayal and abandonment.”  He 63
believes that the analogy of  Taiwan and the orphan became more prominent after President Nixon 
pursued a closer relationship with Communist China and Taiwan was consequently forced out of  the 
United Nations. 
	 In the Orphan of  Asia, author Wu attempts to explain the case of  Taiwanese identity through the 
novel’s main character, Hu Taiming. Hu originally holds a strong desire to visit mainland China to 
discover his Chinese roots, but after traveling to China, he grasps that he has been disillusioned with not 
only the Japanese, but also the mainland. In the end, he realizes he “does not belong anywhere.” Hu, after 
facing an identity crisis, goes crazy. As he becomes consumed by suffering, he composes two poems. One is 
written on the wall of  his family’s ceremonial hall:  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I aspired to be a scholar 
But bowed to thugs— 
Where is the hammer to beat violence? 
As the hero ever dreams,  
The Chinese spirit lives— 
I will lose this life of  mine.  
But how could this be? 
The slave life drips with resentment, 
O but how do we suffer brutes? 
Comrades, reclaim old hills and streams, 
Rise, ye six million, rise ye together— 
Your blood simmering die for duty. 
Later, in his crazed state, he starts chanting: “The head of  the family is the big brother/The big brother is 
the head of  the thieves/People are skinned/Trees are skinned/Mountains are skinned.” The first two lines 
of  the first poem refers to his earlier decision to not only study in Japan, but work with Japanese occupiers 
in Taiwan. “Thugs” refers to the Japanese occupiers, and “the slave” is himself. For the second part, he 
refers to his brother, a government official for the Japanese. When Hu states the people, trees and 
mountains are “skinned,” he is referring to Japan’s use of  Taiwan’s people, money and resources.  This 64
book not only illustrates Taiwanese suffering under Japanese occupation, it also shows the people’s 
struggle to identify with those on the mainland. 
	 When Taiwanese people first heard about the transfer of  power, they were first “happy” with the 
idea of  being ruled again by the Chinese.  However, after the Chinese authorities arrived in Taiwan,  65
 Wu, Zhuoliu. Orphan of  Asia. New York: Columbia UP, 2008. p.244-245. Print.64
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some Taiwanese people expressed their concern over the Kuomintang (KMT) officers’ “lack of  
legitimacy” to rule over Taiwan. Chinese officials also believed that Taiwan’s political elites were too 
‘Japanese.’  Harrison offers readers a first-hand account made by an Taiwanese official watching the 66
disorganized mainland soldiers step off  the ship arriving in Taiwan for the first time: “A great crowd of  
curious and excited citizens had come to support by father’s welcoming committee and to see the show…
The first man to appear was a bedraggled fellow who looked and behaved more like a coolie than a 
soldier, walking off  with a carrying pole across his shoulder, from which suspended his umbrella, sleeping 
mat, cooking pot, and cup.” The General gives descriptions of  a few more soldiers before making the 
statement, “My father wondered what the Japanese could possibly think. He never felt so ashamed in his 
life.”  He claims that in this moment, the moment when Chinese soldiers stepped off  their ship, Taiwan’s 67
legitimacy crisis started. They “had welcomed an imagined China, a classical culture, and a ‘victor,’ but 
was instead confronted by the reality of  Republican China.”  However, as claimed by Harrison and other 68
researchers, the event that inscribed Taiwanese identity “most forcefully” was the 2-28 Incident.  69
	 The KMT’s rule over Taiwan was generally accepted until in 1947, when in the ‘2-28 Incident’ a 
KMT officer assaulted an elderly woman and a shot was fired, killing an onlooker. After this incident, 
massive demonstrations exploded on the issue of  the Chinese Nationalists’ legitimacy to rule Taiwan.  70
Consequently, innocent people were round up and killed by KMT officers, resulting in at least twenty 
thousand people’s deaths. Today, many Taiwanese people still regard this event as the most important 
event that has happened in recent history.  Harrison argues that along with this incident’s violence,  71
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Taiwan was described as “something distinct from China [or the KMT government] in the most extreme 
form possible.”  Shih and Chen state the event “strengthened the native consciousness and became a 72
rallying point for the Taiwanese struggle for liberation from alien rulers (i.e. the KMT government).”  73
Taiwanese people were originally willing to be ruled by their Chinese “brethren,” but after experience 
living under KMT rule, many Taiwanese people believed they could no longer identify themselves with 
the mainland Chinese. Harrison states, “Taiwan was not China, but it had no Taiwanese state education 
system, no national literature, or nationalist identity to legitimize the name and differentiate it from 
China.”  Taiwan was not China, but they had no way to prove themselves. 74
	 After Taiwan’s economic success as one of  the “Four Asian Tigers,” or one of  the countries in 
Asia that became highly industrialized between the early 1960s and 1990s, the Taiwanese felt much 
different from the people on the mainland. Harrison, using examples of  articles from Chinese 
mainlanders who visited Taiwan and vice-versa, claimed that when these people travel to the other side of  
the Strait, they often “reconfirm their sense of  Taiwan’s distinctness rather than its essential 
‘Chineseness.’” In one example, Harrison mentions a 1990s story of  one Taiwanese man who returned to 
the mainland to visit his family’s ancestral hall. When he arrived there, he stated, “Mainland cities seemed 
to be like the cities in Taiwan back in time.” Another man states, “It was difficult for me to remember 
what was my own hometown; just like the feelings of  my identity, [my ancestors] moved on long ago in 
another direction.”   These examples reflect the disconnect felt by many Taiwanese people with their 75
mainland neighbors. The writer of  the story suggests “for people living in Taiwan, traveling to the 
mainland reinforced their sense of  Taiwan’s own identity.”   76
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	 The way in which the Taiwanese framed their movement can be reflected not only on their 
cultural and identity differences, but also in their concerns about a closer relationship with mainland 
China. Author Qi states that people supporting independence in Taiwan’s 2014 Sunflower Movement 
feared that a closer economic relationship will “‘empty’ Taiwan’s own economic resources and add to 
unemployment.”  Reporter John Nylander shares the story of  Febie, a “small cafe owner in Taipei,” who 77
has become “concerned about what will happen to the island’s de facto independence when more and 
more Mainlanders keep flooding in” and when “the economy becomes increasingly dependent on 
Mainland China's business interests.” She states, “I’m not very happy about all these Mainland Chinese 
tourists coming here. Many people in Taiwan want independence.”  She also regards herself  as 78
“Taiwanese,” not “Chinese.”	 In conclusion, Taiwanese identity can be described as one that belongs to 
itself, meaning that because of  historical circumstances, the Taiwanese were able to develop a local 
identity separate from the mainland Chinese. This identity became further perpetrated by different 
governments and economic circumstances. As the 1990s story illustrates, visiting the mainland 
“reconfirmed” Taiwanese people’s own sense of  identity. While this was twenty years ago, I believe that 
this sense of  superiority is still apparent in Taiwanese society. On Quora, an anonymous Taiwanese person 
answers the question “Why do Taiwanese think they are better than mainland Chinese?”: “China and its 
citizens are still experiencing cultural lag. I've literally seen Chinese tourist poop on the streets of  Taiwan. 
Or not wait in line. Or speak bizarrely loudly in private space. Or plant Chinese flags on Taiwanese soil. 
The list goes on. Taiwanese tourists generally do not pee or poop in the public in the view of  all to see, 
and are generally respectful on foreign land. So we develop disdain, contempt, derision.  That, coupled 
with China's not-so-friendly stance and medley missiles, grows the ill feelings.”  Because of  Chinese 79
tourists behavior in Taiwan, the Taiwanese feel even more alienated from the mainland. While the  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Taiwanese do seem to hold a sense of  superiority over the mainland Chinese, Taiwanese people mainly 
worry about their sovereignty. 
Hong Kongese identity and the Hong Kongese independence movement 
	 Hong Kong’s identity is often expressed in a way that shows its contrast to the mainland. Author 
Brian Hooper explains common ideas in the literature of  Hong Kong that are helpful for understanding 
its identity: transit, “vortex” and contrast. Transit expresses Hong Kong’s geographic location as a “point 
of  passage,” while “vortex,” alludes to Hong Kong’s population density and “the individual’s perceived 
inability to evacuate his or her environment.” The last one, “sense of  contrast,” refers to the differences 
between “rich and poor, East and West, Occidental and Oriental, and communist and capitalist.” 
Hooper’s overarching claim is that from the time British culture met Chinese culture in Hong Kong, 
culture, language, traditions, and values “have been combined with or superimposed to form what has 
become Hong Kong culture.”  Hooper believes that a theme exists that of  how “the individual’s quest 80
becomes a collective one,” Hooper gives readers an example through Joan Rogers’ poem “Hong Kong 
Belonger”:  
And on this crowded island  
Where cultural rivers meet  
I join the progeny of  time 
Who throng each busy street 
And calling through the rush hour, 
Whispering in the night, 
Echoing down the flight of  years 
The voices all unite 
Who am I? Where am I 
 Hooper, Brian. Voices in the Heart: Postcolonialism and Identity in Hong Kong Literature, New York, NY: Peter 80
Lang, 2003, p.130-131. Print.
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going?  
To what do I belong? 
This cry in the blood of  East and West 
Is the heartbeat of  Hong Kong.  
	 Hooper states that Hong Kong is a melting pot and its identity is “rooted in this process of  
fusion.”  Hong Kongese radio personality Gary Ngan Luen-mo further explains this “fusion”: “We are 81
the best example of  what a multicultural society should be. We not only incorporate ideas from all over 
the world, we let them flourish.”  In Hong Kong, identity is based around a “melting pot,” open to new 82
ideas and new technologies. As mentioned in the poem, “To what do I belong?” refers to Hong Kong’s 
quest for a solid identity. Much like how the Taiwanese felt after their handover to the KMT, after 150 
years of  British occupation, the Hong Kongese felt an obvious cultural drift between the local people and 
the mainland Chinese. 
	 Understanding Hong Kongese people’s concerns about their future is also a way to understand 
the independence movement’s supporters in Hong Kong. Author Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo states that 
although Hong Kong citizens enjoy a relatively large amount of  democratic freedom, socio-economic 
hardship since the early 2000s have given rise to Hong Kong citizen’s feeling of  contempt towards Hong 
Kong’s government and mainland visitors. After the transfer of  Hong Kong from the British to the 
Chinese, a disagreement on how the concept of  ‘one country, two systems’ followed. After an influx of  
mainland visitors and price inflation, “the accusation of  mainland visitors as ‘locusts’ who extract benefits 
from Hong Kong and that of  the ‘government-business collusion emerged.’”  Economic problems and 83
unemployment among youth in Hong Kong eventually lead to the development of  the pro-democracy 
movement, or the ‘Umbrella Revolution,’ in 2014, which started when student democrats Joshua Wong,  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Chi-fung, Alex Chou and Lester Shum were arrested and detained for plunging into government’s 
headquarters in the Admiralty on the night of  September 26th. The protests ended in December, after a 
counter-effort to change public opinion succeeded in naming the protests “violent.”   84
	 Although Hong Kong’s 2014 mass protest was dubbed the “Umbrella Revolution” by foreign 
media, student democrats described it as “a movement propelling the pace and scope of  democratization 
in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region.”  Hong Kong’s pro-independence movement has only 85
formed through a series of  protests, especially in recent years, with the ‘Umbrella Revolution’ in response 
to concerns over China’s rule over Hong Kong. Democrats and Hong Kong citizens born after the 1990s, 
have expressed concern that Beijing’s interference with Hong Kong’s affairs not only “jeopardizes ‘one 
country, two systems,’ but also endangers the concept of  ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.’”  86
	 In Hong Kong, “localism” has also become a social reaction to mainland China’s growing 
influence. Supporters of  both Hong Kong independence and Hong Kong democracy believe that the two 
systems in the “one country, two systems” model must be politically separate and different so that Hong 
Kong can avoid having a ‘mainland-type’ political system, which is characterized by “political 
paternalism, relative government intolerance of  political dissent and the frequent intervention of  the 
central government in the affairs of  local regions.”  Additionally, before the start of  the Umbrella 87
Revolution, “difficulty in finding housing and climbing the social ladder” caused social unrest, and many 
nativists began “to develop a hatred for both the mainland visitors and the capitalist system in the 
HKSAR.”  However, John Carroll, a professor of  history at Hong Kong University, believes that Hong 88
Kongese people are now less angry with mainland Chinese and more angry with Hong Kong’s  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government.  Nan M. Sussman believes that Hong Kong’s sense of  “local belonging” can be traced back 89
to the 1970s. The author states “people in Hong Kong began to see it as their home rather than a 
temporary shelter, as it was perceived in the early post-war period.” She adds, “That was the time when 
control of  cross-border population flow tightened and when the distinction between Hong Kong and 
mainland China—in socio-economic terms and in political terms—became more palpably felt. To identify 
oneself  as belonging to Hong Kong is, increasingly, to identify oneself  as different and distinct from 
mainland China.”  90
	 One recent pro-independence/localist group that has developed in Hong Kong is Hong Kong 
Indigenous, a group named by media as one that prefers aggression to the peaceful demonstrations that 
were tried, and failed, during the Umbrella Revolution in 2014. The group’s central goal is that it wants 
Hong Kong citizens to be given a vote on the city’s future, including the possibility of  independence after 
2047, when Beijing’s promise to the British expires.  The group believes Dr. King’s statement that “a riot 91
is the language of  the unheard,” and according to young, democratic supporters, the Democratic Party 
and the Civic Party, which are pro-democracy political parties, have not accomplished enough for Hong 
Kong.  92
	 In Hong Kong, many people also see themselves as different from mainland Chinese. Some 
scholars believe that the Hong Kongese people feel that they are culturally superior to the mainland 
Chinese. Longtime Hong Kong journalist David Schlesinger believes that is how people in Hong Kong 
felt when Hong Kong was given back to Communist China 20 years ago. Schlesinger states, “They looked 
down on the mainlanders that came here with bad manners, bad language skills, bad clothes, and who  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didn't really understand business.” He adds, "Now mainlanders come and often times they're better 
educated. They have better English, they have better business skills, they have multiple degrees from 
prestigious institutions, and they get the best slots in law firms and banks, and it's the Hong Kongers who 
lose out.”  Hong Kong legislator Fernando Cheung Chiu-hung also believes some people see themselves 93
as culturally superior to the mainland Chinese. He states, “What it means to be a Hong Konger has 
changed since China began taking control of  the city nearly two decades ago..the older generation has 
family members back in China, and they identify themselves as Chinese. The younger generation doesn't 
see the mainland that way. Everything they see about China is negative. [They see] mainlanders as dirty, 
impolite, and people who take away our resources.”  Chueng believes that some young Hong Kongers 94
have even begun to see themselves as a different ethnicity from mainland Chinese.  About this, Chueng 95
explains, “To them, it makes a lot of  sense, because we have a different history, a different civilization, 
culture, and even language. There’s hatred. There's anger.”  Like Taiwan, a sense of  cultural superiority 96
still exists in parts of  Hong Kong’s society. 
	 In conclusion, Hong Kong people see themselves as a cultural mix of  East and West. While Hong 
Kongese people have expressed economic concerns, supporters of  democracy and independence also wish 
for a politically separate government that practices political tolerance. Hong Kong’s independence 
supporters frame their movement as a “movement propelling the pace and scope of  democratization in 
the Hong Kong Special Administration Region,” while Taiwanese people mainly frame themselves as 
being “de facto independent.” Taiwanese people aim to protect their way of  life, while some in Hong 
Kong hope for a vote on independence in the future. Hong Kongese people, as well as Taiwanese people,  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have felt a disconnect towards their mainland ancestors. In both cases, identity is framed as being 
something distinct from mainland China’s.  
B. National Pride in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
	 Group identity, as well as national identity, is something that can be imagined. When discussing 
identity, Benedict Anderson makes the case that identity does not necessarily have to be concrete, but can 
be “imagined,” meaning that although the “members of  even the smallest nation will never know most of  
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of  them, yet in the minds of  each lives the image of  their 
communion.”   97
	 Identity can be related to citizenship. Some scholars believe that citizenship “entails status, loyalty, 
duties and rights ‘not primarily in relation to another human being, but in relation to an abstract concept, 
the state’ and thus derives its power from ‘identity and virtue.’” By this, citizenship can be a form of  
identity “based on social reciprocity and common interests, which may themselves be based on a sense of  
tradition, ethnicity or lifestyle.” Citizenship also has a potential “to moderate the divisiveness of  other 
identities—gender, religion, race, class and nation.”  This section involves using SPSS to test “National 98
Pride in Taiwan and Hong Kong.” In this part, I analyze data regarding citizenship-related questions for 
both places, such as “How proud are you to be a citizen of  [your country],” from AsianBarometer’s 2010 
and 2012 datasets. This section will attempt to test what Hong Kongese and Taiwanese people think 
about their citizenship to either the Republic of  China or the People’s Republic of  China. 
National Pride in Taiwan and Hong Kong 
a) Theory and Previous Research:  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	 In order to see who would be likely to support Taiwanese and Hong Kongese independence, I will 
attempt to evaluate national pride in Hong Kong and Taiwan by using SPSS to test the value 
“citizenship.” 
	 Certain factors, such as parent’s political views, gender, religion, region and race, can influence a 
person’s political attitude and cultural identity.  In the United States, for example, many children inherit 99
their parents’ views on political matters. People whose parents vote for the Democratic Party may also vote 
for the Democratic Party, and people whose parents vote for the Republican Party may also vote for the 
Republican Party. At least in the United States, gender tends to play a role in politics, as most women vote 
democratic.  100
	 Other factors such as age, education level, social status and income may also play a part in how a 
citizen views its country. Age can affect national pride in that people over 50 may have views that differ 
from their younger counterparts. Perhaps people with more education will vote differently from those with 
less years of  schooling. Those with higher income may reap the benefits of  society, and therefore, be more 
proud to be a citizen of  their country.  
	 Age should have a sizable effect on Taiwan and Hong Kong’s analyses. Journalist John Xenakis 
states that older generations, “especially those with some memory of  the 1949 flight from Mao Zedong’s 
army to Hong Kong and then to Formosa, have clung to the hope that one day Taiwan and Beijing would 
reunite into a single China governed by Taiwan’s Nationalist government.” He adds, “people in younger 
generations understand that this scenario is not even remotely possible, and that reunification would mean 
being governed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing, the same CCP that massacred 
thousands of  college students in Tiananmen Square in 1989, and who have become increasingly 
authoritarian in Hong Kong, breaking their explicit public promise, when Britain returned Hong Kong to  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China in 1997, that they could have fully free and fair elections.”  Age should have an impact on the 101
results. Youth also took a role in the 2014 protests, where age and support for the movement have been 
reported to have strong correlations.  For Taiwan, Chen Chao, in his article, claims that the youth were 102
able to organize well for the Sunflower Movement, and afterwards, were the ones who put Tsai Ing-Wen 
in office.  However, Dongtao Qi’s research has shown that older, less-educated people living in rural 103
Taiwan consider themselves Taiwanese nationalists, and therefore supportive of  Taiwanese 
independence.  In Hong Kong, democrats and Hong Kong citizens born after the 1990s, have expressed 104
concern concerns about Beijing rule in Hong Kong.   105
	 As for education-level, many protestors in both Hong Kong and Taiwan seem to be college 
students or professors, with much of  the “Umbrella Movement” organized by by college unions. Alan 
Cheng, a 25-year-old Hong Konger gives his own opinion, however: “It is not necessarily about education 
any more, it is about who you surround yourself  with.” He felt that education is no longer “a barrier to 
identifying oneself  as a Hongkonger.”  The effect of  education-level can change, if  variables such as 106
social status and income level are taken into account. People with high social status and income are likely 
to have high education-levels, as well. Joseph Wang states online that “If  you are a rich Mainland 
immigrant, then you end up with rich Hong Kong friends, and you are seen as part of  the social elite,”  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and that Hong Kong’s social structure is “class-based...not location based.”  Cheng adds, “The only 107
ones who want to identify themselves as hardcore Chinese are those with political or business interests in 
China.”  108
	 Those with high social status are probably much prouder to be Chinese than those with low social 
status. Because a good economic relationship with China is in the best interest of  wealthy businessman, 
those with higher income, and therefore, social status in Taiwan might have favorably views of  China, so 
they perhaps will not be as proud to be Taiwanese.  
	 Protesters in both Taiwan and Hong Kong emphasize local languages. In McLean’s article about 
language and identity in Hong Kong and Taiwan, she states that through “using Cantonese, the 
[Umbrella Movement] protesters show how they identify first as a ‘Hong Konger’ and not as 
‘Chinese.’”  Those speaking local languages or dialects in Taiwan and Hong Kong are likely to be more 109
supportive of  independence. In relation to this study, Hong Kongese people who speak local languages 
might be less proud to be a citizen of  China. While for Taiwan, local languages also give rise to a sense of  
“strong local identity.”  So those speaking local languages in Taiwan are probably more proud to be a 110
citizen of  Taiwan.  
b) Data and Hypotheses: 
	 The data used in this paper was collected by Asian Barometer, a database run by the Program for 
East Asia Democratic Studies at National Taiwan University. This paper specifically analyzes data for 
Wave 3, or the program’s third survey testing. In Taiwan, the Wave 3 survey was conducted from January 
to February 2010, while in Hong Kong, data was collected from September to November 2012. While  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Wave 4 data is now available for Taiwan, at the time of  the request for data, Wave 4 data for Hong Kong 
was not yet available. The Wave 4 survey for Taiwan was completed in 2014. Data for Asian Barometer 
was collected by conducting face-to-face interviews and by conducting national probability samples.  
	 The dependent variable for this paper is labelled “citizenship” and measures how proud a person 
is to be a citizen of  their country. For this paper, question 154, “How proud are you to be a citizen of  
Taiwan?” or “How proud are you to be a citizen of  the People’s Republic of  China?” is used. For Wave 3, 
the question specifically refers to Hong Kongese people’s citizenship to the People’s Republic of  China, 
rather than their citizenship to Hong Kong. The dependent variable is recoded so that it is ranked from 1 
to 4: 1 means that not proud at all, 2 means not very proud, 3 means somewhat proud, and 4 means very 
proud. 
	 For the first independent variable tested, this paper uses a “female” dummy variable, meaning 
that the interviewees labelled 1 are female, while the interviewees labelled 0 are male.  
	 The second dummy variable is used from question SE3, actual age, and relabelled and recoded as 
“Age over 50,” so interviewees with ages from 0 to 50 are marked 0, while interviewees with ages from 51 
to 100 are marked 1.  
	 The next independent variable is education level, listed as SE5. “Education” is ranked so that 1 
means “no formal education,” 2 means “incomplete primary/elementary,” 3 means “complete primary/ 
elementary,” 4 means “incomplete secondary/high school; technical school/vocational type,” 5 means 
“complete secondary/high school; technical school/vocational type,” 6 means “incomplete secondary/ 
high school,” 7 means “complete secondary/high school,” 8 means “some university education,” 9 means 
“university education completed,” and 10 “means post-graduate degree.”  
	 The fourth variable is “social status,” as provided by question SE12. The question asks 
interviewees to rank their perceived social status. The ranking is from 1 to 10, from lowest status to highest 
status.  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	 As for the fifth variable, it is provided by SE11, or language. This variable is ranked from 1 to 5: 1 
means the person speaks “only local language,” 2 means the person speaks “mostly local language,” 3 
means the person speaks “a mixture of  local and official language,” 4 means the person speaks “mostly 
official language,” and 5 means the person speaks “only official language.” When testing this variable, 
“official language” also seems to include Cantonese for Hong Kong. so it seems that this variable is more 
relevant to Taiwan than Hong Kong.  
	 The next variable, from question SE13a, relates to income. This variable is recoded so that 1 
means income “does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties,” 2 means income “does not cover the 
needs, there are difficulties,” 3 means income “income covers the needs all right, without much difficulty,” 
4 means “Our income covers the needs well, we can save.”  
	 The last variable is from question IR13, which asks for the interviewee’s place of  residence. The 
ranked from 1 to 4, from capital to village. 1 is labelled “Capital or Megacity (1 million population plus),” 
2 is “Regional Center or Other major cities (100,000 plus),” 3 is “Small city or town (less than 100,000 
people),” and 4 is “Village or countryside.” Owing to Hong Kong’s status as a megacity, in this paper, the 
“location” variable is only applied to Taiwan.  
Hypotheses for Taiwan: 
Hypothesis I: All else being equal, more males than females will be more proud to be citizens of  Taiwan. 
• Previous research shows than men tend to be more patriotic than women.   111
Hypothesis II: All else being equal, people over 50 will be more proud to be citizen of  Taiwan, while people 
under 50 will be less proud to be a citizen of  Taiwan. 
• People under 50 play a big part in Taiwanese protests, so they might be less proud of  the 
Taiwanese government. In 2010, at the time of  the survey, the leader of  Taiwan was Ma Ying-
jeou, who was Chairman of  the KMT and advocated for closer ties with China. Perhaps people  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• under 50 were less satisfied of  their government at that time, and therefore, less proud to be a 
citizen of  Taiwan.  
Hypothesis III: All else being equal, people with lower education levels will be more proud to be a citizen of  
Taiwan, while people with higher education levels will be less proud to be a citizen of  Taiwan.  
• Dongtao Qi’s research shows that the less educated tend to be more nationalistic in Taiwan.  112
Hypothesis IV: All else being equal, people with a lower social status will be more proud to be Taiwanese, 
while people with a higher social status will be less proud to be Taiwanese. 
• Dongtao Qi’s research shows that many of  Taiwanese farmers and those with lower social status 
are more nationalistic than others.  113
Hypothesis V: All else being equal, people who speak less local language will be less proud to be Taiwanese, 
while people who speak more local language will be more proud to be a citizen of  Taiwan. 
• As stated before, people used local languages in Hong Kong and Taiwan to emphasize their local 
identities.   114
Hypothesis VI: All else being equal, people with lower income will be more proud to be Taiwanese, while 
people with higher income will be less proud to be Taiwanese. 
• Previous research conducted shows that poor farmers are the most nationalistic group in Taiwan. 
Those with higher income may want closer economic ties with China.   115
Hypothesis VII: All else being equal, people living in cities in Taiwan will be less proud to be a citizen of  
Taiwan, while people living in villages will be more proud to be Taiwanese. 
• Research indicates that those living in rural Taiwan are more nationalistic than others.  116
 Qi, The Taiwan Independence Movement, p. 115.112
 Ibid.113
 McLean-Dreyfus, "Say It Loud: Language and…”114
 Qi, The Taiwan Independence Movement, p. 115-116.115
 Ibid.116
30
Hypotheses for Hong Kong: 
Hypothesis I: All else being equal, more males than females will be more proud to be citizens of  China. 
• Previous research shows that men tend to be more patriotic than women.   117
Hypothesis II: All else being equal, older people will be more proud to be a citizen of  China, while younger 
people will be less proud to be a citizen of  China.  
• People under 50 were affected by economic changes brought by closer economic ties with the 
mainland. People under 50 were the ones mostly involved in the 2014 Umbrella Revolution.  118
Hypothesis III: All else being equal, people with lower education levels will be more proud to be a citizen of  
China, while people with higher education levels will be less proud to be a citizen of  China. 
• Many of  the protestors were college-educated or recent graduates, who have had trouble finding 
jobs.  119
Hypothesis IV: All else being equal, people with a lower social status will be less proud to be a citizen of  
China, while people with a higher social status will be more proud to be a citizen of  	China.  
• People with higher social status are likely to have more business and social connections with 
people from the mainland.  120
Hypothesis V: All else being equal, people speaking less local languages will be more proud to be Chinese, 
while those speaking more local languages will be less proud to be Chinese.  
• Local languages were used by protesters to emphasize a strong local identity.  121
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Hypothesis VI: All else being equal, people with less income will be less proud to be a citizen of  China, 
while people with higher income will be more proud to be a citizen of  China. 
• People with higher income are likely to have more business connections with people from 
mainland China.   122
c) Analysis: 
My first step in the analysis, after taking 
care of  missing values, was to view the 
descriptive statistics for each place. Here are 
the descriptive statics of  each variable in my 
analysis for the research conducted in 
Taiwan in 2010:  
As indicated by the median and mean, most 
Taiwanese people interviewed in 2010 considered themselves “somewhat proud” to be a citizen of  
Taiwan.  
	 As for the dummy variable “female,” there were less females than males interviewed. The mean 
for the dummy variable “Age over 50” is less than .5, so most people interviewed were younger than 50 
years old. Most people interviewed had higher education levels. The people interviewed considered 
themselves to have a pretty low social status; the mean is 5.49 of  10. When testing for income no one 
indicated that they felt that their income “does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties,” so the 
minimum for that variable is 2. For the most part, people believed their income “covers the needs all right, 
without much difficulty.” As for language, the people interviewed spoke more local language than the 
official language. Most of  the people interviewed also lived in cities or regional centers.  
	 As for Hong Kong, most people interviewed in 2012 considered themselves “somewhat proud” to 
be a citizen of  China. Most of  the people interviewed were female and over the age of  50. Most of  the  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Taiwan descriptive statistics 
people interviewed had completed the 
vocational type of  high school. The people 
interviewed also viewed their social status to 
be pretty low, while the people generally 
said their income “covers the needs all right, 
without much difficulty.” As for language, 
most people spoke the “official language.”  
	 The next part of  my analysis was finding the regression results for Taiwan and Hong Kong. The 
variables in the chart marked with one of  more (*) indicates that the value is significant. If  the p-value is 
less than 0.1, the value is marked with (*). If  the p-value is less than 0.05, the value is marked with (**). If  
the p-value is less than 0.01, the value is marked with (***). All of  these indicate the values range of  
significance.  
	 For my analysis of  Taiwan, I used the regression model: [citizenship] = β0 + 
β1*[female] + β2*[age over 50] + β3*[education] + β4*[social status] + 
β5*[income] + β6*[language] + β7*[location]. The final regression equation for 
Taiwan is: [citizenship]= 3.173 + (.051*female) + (.071*age over 50) - (.
014*education) + (.017*social status) +(.017*income) + (.003*language) - (.
027*location).   
	 As for Hong Kong, my regression model is as follows: [citizenship] = β0 + 
β1*[female] + β2*[age over 50] + β3*[education] + β4*[social status] + 
β5*[income] + β6*[language]. 
	 The final regression equation for Hong Kong is:[citizenship]=3.368 - (.161*female) + (.222*age 
over 50) - (.018*education) - (.038*social status) + (.025*income) - (.056*language). From this regression 
equation, we know that a one-unit increase in “citizenship” is associated with numbers in the regression  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Hong Kong descriptive statistics
equation. For example, a one-unit increase in “citizenship” is associated with a (.025) increase in income, (.
222) increase in age, and so on. 
	 We can use the regression equation in this way: when evaluating 
different people of  society, we can determine their measure of  
“citizenship,”or how proud they are to be a citizen of  their country. For 
example, for a Taiwanese woman over 50, with no formal education, 
with a mid-level social status, income that “covers the needs all right, 
without much difficulty,” who speaks only the local language and who 
lives in a village, her regression model would look something like this: 
3.173 + (.051*1) + (.071*1) - (.014*1) + (.017*5) + (.017*3) + (.003*1) - 
(.027*4). Her estimated “citizenship” level would be 3.312. When 
analyzing at a woman with the same characteristics in Hong Kong, her estimated regression model would 
be 3.368 - (.161*1) + (.222*1) - (.018*1) - (.038*5) + (.025*3) - (.056*4). The resulting number would be 
3.072. These equations can be used in this way to find how proud a Hong Kongese or Taiwanese person 
might have been to be a citizen of  Taiwan or Hong Kong, based on certain characteristics. As stated 
before, the value “citizenship” is ranked from 1 to 4, with 1 meaning that the person is “not proud at all” 
of  their citizenship, and with 4 meaning that the person is “very proud” of  their citizenship. This shows 
that these women are “somewhat proud” of  their citizenship. 
	 In the next part, I analyzed which values were significant for each 
country. I additionally made one table so that the two countries could be 
compared. For Taiwan, only “Age over 50” and “social status” are significant. 
Both “Age over 50” and “social status” are positive values and are significant at 
the 10 percent level. For Hong Kong, “female,” “Age over 50,” and “social 
status” are significant. “Age over 50” is significant at the 1 percent level, while 
“social status” is significant at the 5 percent level. “Female” and “social status”  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are negative values, while “Age over 50” is a positive value.  
d) Project Conclusions: 
	 As for my hypotheses for Taiwan, my hypothesis that “more males than females in Taiwan would 
be proud to be a citizen of  Taiwan” was not supported by the data. My hypothesis that “people with lower 
education levels will be more proud to be a citizen of  Taiwan” was also not supported. The hypothesis that 
“people speaking less local language will be less proud to be Taiwanese” was not supported. Another set of  
hypotheses not supported nor significant were “people with lower income will be more proud to be Taiwanese,” 
as well as the hypothesis that “people living in cities will be less proud to be Taiwanese.”  
	 While “social status” was proven significant for Taiwan, my hypothesis that “people with higher 
social status will be less proud to be Taiwanese” was not supported. In the regression results, “social status” 
has a positive value. The likely cause of  this is that people with a higher social status in Taiwan have more 
prominent positions in society and live a comfortable life. They then, may be proud to be a citizen of  
Taiwan.  
	 Another value that was significant for Taiwan is “Age over 50.” This supports my hypothesis that 
“people over 50 will be more proud to be a citizen of  Taiwan.” A possible cause of  these feelings could be 
Taiwan’s democratization. Taiwan has become a more free and open society since martial law was 
dropped in 1987 and the DPP was established in 1986. 
	 As for my hypotheses for Hong Kong, my hypothesis that “people with higher education levels 
would be less proud to be a citizen of  China” was not supported by the analysis. While, my hypothesis “those 
speaking more local language will be less proud to be Chinese” was also not supported. The last hypothesis 
with an insignificant regression outcome is the hypothesis that “people with higher income will be more 
proud to be a citizen of  China.” 
	 However, other hypotheses were supported. For example, the hypothesis that “males more than 
females will be proud to be a citizen of  China” was supported by the data. The hypothesis that “people over  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50 will be more proud to be a citizen of  China” was also supported. As proved by the regression results, 
people with higher social status were more proud to be a citizen of  China.  
	 From what I have discovered from my research, in 2010, people over 50 and people with higher 
social status in Taiwan were more proud to be Taiwanese, and in 2012, Hong Kongese people over 50, males 
and people with lower social status were more proud to be a citizen of  the People’s Republic of  China. For 
Taiwan, this project has supported previous research conducted by author Dongtao Qi that suggests older 
people are more proud to be Taiwanese. As for Hong Kong, I was not expecting people with lower social 
status to be more proud to be Chinese and for people with higher social status to be less proud to be 
Chinese. 
	 Perhaps one reason why people over 50 were more proud to be Taiwanese is that, at the time of  
the survey the KMT government was in power. In 2014, young people generally participated in the 
Sunflower Movement. People over 50, with relatives who remember the Chinese Civil War, may have 
wanted Taiwan to have closer relations with the mainland, and so, they may have been proud of  the 
government (under KMT rule) at that time. People with a higher social status perhaps reap the benefit of  
economic relations with the mainland.  
	 In Hong Kong, perhaps people over 50 face less socio-economic problems than people born after 
the 1990s. I think because the older generation did not face as much problems as the younger generation, 
they were generally more proud to be a citizen of  China. Additionally, in Hong Kong, males and people 
with lower social status were more proud to be Chinese. In the descriptive statistics for Hong Kong, people 
generally perceived themselves to have a lower social status. For this, additional research must be 
conducted to further evaluate these results.  
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III. Political Opportunity & Strategies 
A. Politics & Political Opportunity 
	 Political opportunity, as mentioned before, is the “degree to which groups are likely to be able to 
gain access to power and manipulate the political system,”  while political opportunity structures form 123
when society or the political system changes, allowing for collective action.  124
This section will analyze the “politics” and “political opportunity” of  Taiwan and Hong Kong’s 
independence movements. This paper finds that while the political opportunity structure for the 
Taiwanese independence movement has decreased on an international scale, its political opportunity 
structure has expanded in Taiwan. Additionally, in Hong Kong, by seeking positions in the legislative 
body, independence supporters have attempted to create political opportunity for themselves. 
Political Opportunity of  Taiwan’s Independence Movement	  
	 When discussing the political opportunity structure of  the Taiwanese independence movement, 
most researchers would look to the past. Because the Taiwanese independence movement developed soon 
after the KMT came to Taiwan, many scholars analyze its emergence from this point. In Mark Harrison’s 
book Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of  Taiwanese Identity, he mentions that owing to the 
KMT’s authoritarian regime, Taiwan’s independence movement was not a mass movement in Taiwan 
until the 1980s. In 1986, the Democratic People’s Progressive Party (DPP) was established, and in 1987, 
martial law was lifted. After this, the DPP became the first political party to challenge the Chinese 
National Party’s (KMT) authoritarian regime. At this point in time, the political opportunity structure 
changed  and expanded the independence movement’s opportunity for collective action.  
	 Before the establishment of  the DPP, the independence movement mainly existed outside Taiwan, 
when a few people, in the aftermath of  the 2-28 Incident, left Taiwan to create a nationalist movement. 
Although there was no political opportunity structure within Taiwan, supporters of  the independence  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movement first tried to create one outside of  it. Supporters first went to Japan, then the United States to 
establish their headquarters. 
	 Over time, the political opportunity structure for the independence movement, however, has 
generally decreased at an international scale. For example, facing pressure from the KMT government, 
the Japanese government felt obliged to send some supporters of  Taiwanese independence back to Taiwan 
to be put on trial. After the establishment of  the their headquarters in the United States, the status of  
Taiwan as independent from mainland China became threatened when the United Nations decided to 
only recognize the People’s Republic of  China as the official representative of  China. It was not until after 
martial law was lifted that the Taiwanese independence movement had the political opportunity to 
develop on Taiwanese soil.  
	 As for the general treatment of  protestors by authorities in Taiwan, people supporting Taiwanese 
independence are generally treated with tolerance and only face issues with KMT government officials or 
supporters. An example of  the most violent protest policing in Taiwan can be described in the aftermath 
of  the “2-28 Incident.”  While policing under KMT’s authoritarian regime was a problem before, 125
supporters no longer face this kind of  problem. Right now, Taiwan’s president is from the DPP. Qi 
describes Taiwan’s government under DPP leadership as a “movement government,” or a government 
that “tends to emphasize movement principles and goals at the expense of  government performance and 
mobilize the movement base to help secure power.”  This means that opportunity is very much available 126
for collective action for independence in Taiwan. More about the organization of  Taiwan’s independence 
movement will be described more in the next section.  
Politics & Political Opportunity of  Hong Kong’s Independence Movement 
	 As for Hong Kong’s independence movement, the emergence of  the Umbrella Movement came 
with the Standing Committee of  the National People's Congress’ proposed electoral reform, in which  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nomination for a political candidate would require Beijing’s approval. Li Fei, the secretary general of  the 
committee at that time stated, that candidates would be required to “love the country, and love Hong 
Kong” and would have to “protect the broad stability of  Hong Kong now and in the future.”  This 127
“opportunity for protest” fluctuated with protest policing and secret attempts by the Chinese government 
to stop protestors. However, the ‘failure’ of  this protest caused other opportunities to develop. As 
supporters for independence disagreed with the way in which the government reacted to their demands, 
many supporters tried to find political opportunities through the 2016 elections. 
 	 Before Hong Kong’s control was transferred from London to Beijing, secret negotiations between 
the two polarized the political landscape. According to Lo and Bettinger, Hong Kong democrats 
emphasized ideals of  freedom, equality and autonomy, while pro-Beijing constituents valued stability, 
harmony and prosperity.  Brian Denny believes the rapid emergence of  the democratic left signifies the 128
“radicalization and polarization of  Hong Kong’s democracy movement.”  129
	 The students and supporters of  the pro-democracy group Occupy Central have expressed before 
that the government in Hong Kong “make(s) it impossible for anyone not trusted by the Chinese 
government to stand for election.” The protestors in the Umbrella Movement accuse Beijing of  breaking 
vows to give Hong Kong people genuine democracy.  Because many Hong Kong people felt that their 130
rights were being violated by Beijing, many want to participate in opposition, i.e. the independence 
movement, which later evolved into political organizations. 
	 Protestors wanted to open up the political positions to genuine contest. Protestor Nathan Law 
states in an article, “If  I had the chance to express my political opinion with dignity, I don’t think it would  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be necessary to plan such things,” referring to an attempt to intercept a visiting senior Chinese official’s 
motorcade in May.  Only a small minority of  people support separatism,  but the way the Chinese 131 132
government responded to this opposition could have been a determining factor for how the movement 
was able to win further supporters. The opinion given by Law reflects lack of  political dialogue between 
movement organizers and the government. 
	 As for the Chinese government’s suppression of  the movement, many original supporters of  the 
movement feel threatened while at home. For example, in an article published last February, Mr. Chan 
Kin-man, one of  the professors who helped to found the movement, has reported feeling unsafe at home, 
checking his apartment for bugs.  Also related to this is the disappearance of  Hong Kong booksellers. 133
Abducted for selling books critical of  the Communist government, sixty-one year old Lam Wing-kee, was 
forced to sit in confinement for five months straight in mainland China. To cover up the abduction, Lam 
was forced to participate in a state-run broadcast, stating that he was there “to face justice for his role in a 
fatal 2003 hit-and-run car accident in the Chinese coastal city of  Ningbo.” He later told reporters, “It was 
a show, and I accepted it. I had to follow the script. If  I did not follow it strictly, they would ask for a 
retake.”   Journalist Dominique Rowe reported in her article that the Hong Kong government has “tried 134
unsuccessfully to rein in the rapidly growing movement, threatening teachers with dismissal if  they raise 
the subject in classrooms and disqualifying independence activists from standing in elections.”  These  135
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examples indicate the mainland government’s fierce opposition to the movement in Hong Kong, and its 
attempts to stop it from growing. 
	 However, the mainland government’s strategies for suppression may only be causing more people 
in Hong Kong to turn to the movement. For example, Hong Kong Baptist University’s Jean-Pierre 
Cabestan stated that the 2016 legislative election results “is a strong signal to Beijing that its heavy-handed 
policy is just alienating more Hongkongers and is actually the real reason of  the growing pro-
independence sentiment.”  The mainland government may only be hurting its chance to resolve this 136
problem. 
	 In conclusion, as Meyer quotes Kriesi: “the state can invite action by facilitating access, but it can 
also provoke action by producing unwanted policies and political threats.”  In the case of  Hong Kong, 137
unwanted policies and reactions by the Chinese government has caused Hong Kong supporters to find 
other ways to express their concerns. By seeking positions in the legislative body, Hong Kongers have 
attempted to create political opportunity for themselves. 
B. Strategies & Organization 
	 Framing the collective identity of  a movement is a strategy, itself. Jill Kiecolt mentions the creation 
of  collective identity as the “central task” of  a social movement. She states that a social movement must 
“ensure that its members incorporate the movement’s collective identity into their own self-definitions.”  138
With the creation of  collective identity, social movement organizers make “conscious strategic efforts…to 
fashion shared understandings of  the world and of  themselves that legitimate and motivate collective 
action.”  These strategic efforts, along with other strategies, will be discussed below.  139
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Organization & Strategies of  the Taiwanese Independence Movement  
	 For Taiwan, the idea of  independence has largely become ingrained in its culture and politics. In 
Taiwan’s political environment, a common opinion between the green party and blue party is that Taiwan 
is a “de facto independent country, and deserves the official UN membership.”  The Taiwanese already 140
believe that they are culturally and politically separate from China, and they also disagree with the 
Republic of  China’s Constitution that advocates Taiwan to retake the mainland. The Taiwanese believe 
that they “should be a country independent of  both PRC and ROC.”  141
	 Taiwan’s independence movement, overtime, has had its foundations morphed into political 
organizations; the first organization backing it being the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Qi describes 
the Taiwanese government when the DPP is in power as a “movement government,” however, he also 
claims that although the Democratic Progressive Party supports the Taiwan Independence Movement, the 
independence movement is still “very much a social movement and stays relatively independent of  the 
government.”  Although the party supports Taiwanese independence, the movement will not influence 142
governmental decisions. But many green-party supports are proponents of  Taiwanese independence, so 
the Party can still utilize this to gain votes.  143
	 There are other Pan-Green organizations with more extreme stances when it comes to Taiwanese 
independence. For example, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (Táiwān Tuánjié Liánméng) specifically 
supports Taiwanese localism and independence. Whereas the DPP website does not have a section 
specifically related to Taiwanese independence, the Taiwan Solidarity Union’s website states “Since the 
direct election of  the DPP president in 1996, the position of  Taiwan as an independent sovereign state has 
been established,” and “all the people must jointly safeguard the freedom, democracy and security of  the  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Taiwanese nation from being violated.”  Another Pan-Green party is the New Power Party, recently 144
formed after the 2014 Sunflower Movement. As of  2016 elections, the party has won five legislative seats. 
Perhaps the case can be made, that because the Democratic Progressive Party, has of  late, implied that it 
wants to continue the status quo, many people are willing to vote for it. Because people are afraid of  a 
possible attack from mainland China, as a response to possible extreme policies, many people want to 
maintain the status quo. This can follow the case of  “radical flank effects,” which as mentioned before, 
happens when the presence of  extremists “encourage funding of  the moderates as a way of  undercutting 
(the extremists) influence.”  145
	 Some Chinese people have argued that in Taiwan’s efforts to be seen as independent, the 
Taiwanese have tried to seem as culturally different from mainland as they possibly can. This can also be 
seen as a strategy. An example of  Taiwanese people In Zhang’s blog, he contributes Taiwanese people’s 
unwillingness to rejoin the mainland to Taiwan’s enjoyment of  its democratic way of  life. He states that, 
“instead of  saying that the people of  Taiwan do not agree that they are Chinese, it is better to say that the 
people of  Taiwan do not agree with China's life. They have become accustomed to the way of  life in 
Taiwan and are deeply in love with such a life [for] Taiwanese reasons.”  146
	 Calling oneself  Taiwanese has become in itself  a strategy of  protest. Qi mentions in his book, 
“gradually, ‘pro-China’ activities became politically incorrect and none of  the politicians would like to 
receive such condemnation from their political rivals.”  Calling oneself  Taiwanese has begun to mean 147
that one cares about freedom of  speech and other fundamental rights, while calling oneself  Chinese in 
Taiwan has begun to have negative implications.  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	 As mentioned before, in his book Legitimacy, Meaning and Knowledge in the Making of  Taiwanese Identity, 
Harrison gives some examples of  people who decided to travel from the mainland to Taiwan or from 
Taiwan to the mainland in the 1990s to find that, culturally, their way of  life is different from each other. 
One person states, “of  course I can imagine people from the mainland having the same kind of  desire for 
the benefits of  modern life.”  During the 1980s, as one of  Asia’s “Little Tigers,” Taiwan was seen as 148
“ahead” of  the mainland, and the mainland was seen as socially and economically poor.  These 149
differences can be not only be attributed to long separation from mainland China, but can be attributed to 
different economic systems and the divergence of  different cultural values, as well. 
	 Identity is a strategy not only for the social movement and political organizations, but also for the 
Taiwanese people as it is used as a defense of  their democratic government and way of  life. In the paper 
titled “Nationalism and Self  Determination: identity politics in Taiwan,” author Jou-Juo Chu argues “that 
lying behind all the obsessions for a new Taiwan-centered identity is primarily the impulse to fight for a 
sovereignty that can guarantee an unconstrained international space, rather than a nationalist motive to 
cut off  all the cultural and racial identification with China.”   150
	 The Taiwanese independence movement has legitimacy through its political party institutions. 
Regarding money, facilities and labor, the independence movement gains these resources through the 
political organizations it has morphed into. The independence movement also receives support from 
localists, whose objectives are similar to those advocating for Taiwanese independence. Qi mentions that 
other social movements have also had a long relationship with the Taiwanese independence movement 
and offers the opposition movement and the pro-democracy movement, as examples.  151
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	 The independence movement’s ideas can be seen in Taiwanese film and media. Doctor Robert 
Hyland of  Queens University in Canada, has researched how Taiwanese film reflects localist values. In his 
introduction to his article on “Global Politics and a Cinema of  Localism: Contemporary Taiwanese 
Film,” he uses Wei Te-sheng’s 2008 Cape No. 7 film as an example, in which the main character, a singer, 
smashes his guitar and says “Fuck Taipei,” in regards to “fake” Taiwanese politics—those with a close 
relationship to Beijing—before heading on a journey to the South coast.  152
Organization & Strategies of  the Hong Kongese Independence Movement 
	 As for Hong Kong’s independence movement, the idea of  independence from the People’s 
Republic of  China is still seen to be very radical to many people living inside and outside Hong Kong. As 
described in one Economist article, supporters are “commonly dismissed by mainstream commentators as 
belonging to a radical fringe.”  However, like Taiwan in the past, Hong Kong has been experiencing a 153
rise in localist groups; for example, the localist group called Civic Passion. Civic Passion is a localist group 
that supports a militant approach for gaining independence. As of  late, however, the group is making 
more efforts to appear “moderate.”  154
	 The first organization that ignited the Umbrella Movement and published the idea of  possible 
independence from the People’s Republic of  China is the Hong Kong University Students’ Union. 
Articles published by the organization in 2014 includes "The Hong Kong nation deciding its own fate" 
and "Democracy and Independence for Hong Kong.” Another article was published again in March 2016 
called “Hong Kong Youth’s Declaration.” This declaration states, “even though Hong Kong doesn’t have  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the conditions to become independent yet ... whether independence is viable or not is not our main 
concern. The main point is whether Hong Kong should become independent.”  155
	 Leading up to Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, many political organizations were formed, 
calling for support for a more democratic Hong Kong. Groups include Youngspiration and Hong Kong 
Nationalist Party, the first political organization to advocate for Hong Kong’s independence, and the party 
rejects the Basic Law stating “Hong Kong is an inalienable part of ” China.  Political organizations 156
supporting Hong Kong independence also include a group called Hong Kong Indigenous, formed in 
2015. The group believes in Dr. King’s statement that “a riot is the language of  the unheard,” while Mr. 
Leung, the leader of  Hong Kong Indigenous states in an article that Hong Kong must “develop and 
reinforce a local identity” and “draw a line between us and them.”  157
	 As mentioned by Mr. Leung, Hong Kongese must “draw a line between us and them.” This 
underlines identity as a protest strategy. An example of  this is on the Facebook page called “英屬⾹香港 
British Hong Kong,” a page perhaps romanticizing Hong Kong’s past colonizers. Page administrators 
shared a photograph from a page called “Hong Kong & China [are] NOT the SAME 中港⼤大不同.” The 
words across the top of  the 2013 photo are “we are not British, but don’t call us Chinese. We are Hong 
Kongers.” The paragraph below these words encourages overseas Hong Kongese to call themselves 
“Hong Kongers, not Chinese.” They also encourage overseas Hong Kongers to educate themselves on the 
issues facing Hong Kong.  A photo from February 5, 2014, after the end of  the Umbrella Movement, 158
shows the words “Hong Kong is not a part of  China” placed over a scene of  Hong Kong. The caption  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below the picture states, “Part of  china? Why [do] we need a passport or permit (for) entry there? Why 
don’t (we) have the residency (there)? The so-call(ed) one country two systems is just a name to fool those 
who believe Hong Kong is in China, while we are outside China, but being controlled. Just like Tibet. And 
we are not Chinese. We are Hongkongers.”  159
	 Identity can also be a protest strategy also in the way that identity was portrayed in the images 
created by Local Studio HK in 2015. This studio portrays how they think Hong Kongers are different from 
mainland Chinese. A few examples are on the next page. The images presented above relate to what 
Hong Kong people think of  as problems that may plague mainland China’s society. For example, as 
indicated with the first photo on the top left, Hong Kong people may take pride in having a government 
that can be considered more free and democratic than the mainland. As the second photograph on the 
top right indicates, Chinese society may be considered to be more closed off  from the rest of  the world, 
because of  the fact that certain websites are banned by the government in mainland China. It is important 
to note, however, that in reality, Chinese youth are able to download VPNs (virtual private networks) to 
access government-blocked websites such as Facebook and Twitter. The photograph on the bottom left 
expresses concerns about food safety in mainland China, while the last photo shows Hong Kongers' 
possible distaste of  the Communist Party and of  their own government.  160
	 During the Umbrella Revolution, protestors started using “alternative media,” meaning social 
media websites rather than traditional newspapers, to state their opinions regarding the pro-democracy 
movement. According to researcher Kwong Ying-Ho, most mainstream media organizations “took an 
anti-movement stance and practice(d) self-censorship so as not to offend the Chinese government.” 
Kwong states, mainstream media “avoid(ed) sensitive topics or use(d) alternative means (employing foreign  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media reports) to handle these issues in order not to provoke Chinese leaders.”  As a result of  this, 161
protestors and those wanting to complain about the government took to the internet to vent their 
complaints.  In Kwong’s 2014 survey, 49.1% of  Hong Kongers believed media practiced self-censorship, 162
while 56.7% believed that the media had reservations about criticizing the Chinese government. As for the 
protestors’ perceptions, main stream media remained conservative due to “business connections with 
China.”  During this time, the credibility of  online media was “boosted.”  Another strategy during  163 164
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protest was local language. McLean states, “using Cantonese, the [Umbrella Movement] protesters show 
how they identify first as a ‘Hong Konger’ and not as ‘Chinese.’”  165
	 Other strategies, besides online media, include video production, such as the Ten Years film. Ten 
Years won Best Picture at the Hong Kong Film Awards in March 2016, and the film, which started its 
production in 2014, is “popular because it shows the hopes and fears of  Hong Kong citizens living under 
Chinese rule.”  In the film, considered to be a “thought virus” by a mainland editorial, the question that 166
the directors were pursuing with this film is: “If  nothing changes in Hong Kong, what will the city be like 
in 10 years?”   The film is composed of  five different parts. The film opens up with a scene depicting a 167
secret meeting between political advisors. These advisors suggest that a political leader should be shot at a 
political meeting held later that day. The reason for this? The mainland government wants to have a 
reason to pass a stricter security law. The next part goes into almost an apocalyptic scene—two people 
seem to be the last people on Earth.  
	 For the second part of  the film, a taxi driver’s problems are described as more and more 
restrictions are placed on taxi drivers who do not fulfill the proper standard language (putonghua) 
requirements. As the story goes on, a focus is placed on the frustrations felt by the taxi driver as he 
discovers he cannot communicate with most of  his customers. The next part deals specifically with the 
fight for Hong Kong independence. This part starts with a television news report about an unknown 
person burning themselves outside the British embassy and ends when it is found out that an elderly 
woman participating in the protests sacrificed herself  for the people of  Hong Kong after witnessing police 
brutality against protestors for independence.  
	 The final part of  the movie deals with an egg seller and a book store owner. A Hong Kongese 
man is sitting in his store when he receives a phone call from his egg supplier. Apparently, because of  new  
 McLean-Dreyfus, Marie-Alice. "Say It Loud: Language and Identity in Taiwan and Hong Kong.”165
 Yu, Alan. "In 'Ten Years,' A Dystopian Vision Of  Hong Kong's Future Under China." NPR, 7 July 166
2016. Web. 12 Feb. 2017.
 Ibid.167
49
restrictions, his supplier decided to move to Taiwan to work on a farm there. Later, a group of  “Youth 
Guard” students come by, dressed as if  they are students from the decade of  China’s Cultural Revolution. 
The leader of  the group of  students takes a photo of  the sign that says “local eggs.” When the man asks 
why the student is taking a photograph, the student replies that “local” is on the list of  restricted words, 
which students should report. The group of  students, along with the egg supplier’s son, come by later 
when the store is closed to throw eggs at it, depicting a scene that reflects something reminiscent to what 
happened in China’s Cultural Revolution, when children opposed their parents for the sake of  politics—
something that was completely unheard of  before in a Confucian society. The ending scene is at the 
bookseller’s secret room, where he keeps all of  his banned books. The father asks his child, “How do they 
think they can ban things from existence?” The ending sentence comes from the boy: “Right, even 
Doraemon is banned, idiots.”  
	 This film’s importance is that it reflects the fears of  Hong Kong’s people. It reflects fears about an 
increasingly non-open government, fears about the demise of  the Cantonese language, fears about book 
restrictions and fears about a more fiercely “educated” youth under an increasingly oppressive system. 
Some scenes have been said to be exaggerated, however, executive producer of  the film, Andrew Choi, 
mentioned in an article, “A lot of  people are saying, 'You don't have to wait 10 years, it's already 
happening now.’”  Former Umbrella Movement leader Joshua Wong also gave his opinion on the film’s 168
exaggeration: “If  something as absurd as the bookseller case can happen in Hong Kong, can we really 
rule out anything in the future?”  In regards to the ending scene, author Alan Yu mentions that the word 169
“local” has “become politically charged since a ‘localist’ political movement began fighting the growing 
influence of  mainland China and advocating a ‘Hong Kong-first’ approach.”  Additionally, another film 170
will be coming out this year on Netflix about the actual Umbrella Movement. The film is called Joshua:  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Teenager vs. Superpower, after the young independence leader, Joshua Wong. Wong has expressed that “the 
most important thing is to reach the people who are interested in the democracy movement in Hong 
Kong,” and that he hopes the film will spread awareness of  Hong Kong’s politics. Cheung Chor-yung, a 
political scientist at City University believes that people will be interested in this film, “because there are 
all sorts of  elements – a giant authoritarian state being confronted by a young and fragile-looking 
student.”  171
 	 In conclusion, strategies for Hong Kong’s independence movement can be seen in how the 
protestors organized themselves for the election of  Hong Kong’s Legislative Council, as well as in film and 
media production. During the September 2016 elections in Hong Kong, the ‘localists’ groups won six 
seats in the seventy-member legislative council, while twenty three pan-democrats and one centrist were 
also elected.  This election is significant in that the turnout rate was 58.28 percent, the highest turnout 172
rate after the British handover in 1997.  Also significant is that some ‘localists’ won in different 173
geographic locations, “breaking the traditional dominance of  the pro-Beijing and pro-democracy parties” 
that those areas had before. Candidates were also very young, “with little resources or networks to support 
them.”  Before these elections, however, on July 14, 2016, the Electoral Affairs Commission sent out a 174
notice that candidates would have to sign a form that stated candidates would have to agree that they 
believe in “one country, two systems.” This resulted in six people’s nominations being disqualified.  175
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V. Conclusions 
	 In conclusion, the two independence movements have many similarities that make a comparative 
analysis constructive for understanding the mainland government’s problems in relation to Hong Kong 
and Taiwan. Chinese scholar Zhu Jie, after completing a similar study, believes that both governments 
want to become a democracy, and they both want to use democracy as an “excuse” to become 
independent.  While both supporters argue for democratic values, they mostly express that they want a 176
government free from “oppressive forces.” 
	 Hong Kongese and Taiwanese independence supporters hold different ideas about what 
independence means. In Hong Kong, independence means having a government that is politically 
separate from the mainland’s government. As for Taiwan, there are two definitions of  independence for 
Taiwan. One is ROC independence (huadu), and the other is Taiwan independence (taidu). ROC 
independence “holds that Taiwan is already an independent state,” but the Taiwan independence 
definition claims that Taiwan “is not an independent state unless the Republic of  China regime is 
overthrown and replaced by the Republic of  Taiwan,”  or a government not influenced by the KMT. 177
Regardless of  either definition, supporters’ main goal is creating a government for the Taiwanese people, 
and in this sense, Taiwanese people already regard themselves as independent from the mainland. Political 
scientist Chieh-Ting Yeh describes Taiwan’s independence movement’s strategy as “nation-building,” 
which later developed to “Taiwanize” the ROC. This means instead of  “overthrowing the ROC outright,” 
the movement created a political party that attempted to represent both political values and the people of  
Taiwan. He explains that this strategy emerged because “Taiwanese independence, the revolutionary kind 
anyway [i.e. undoing ROC’s political system], did not enjoy support from the majority of  Taiwan’s 
population.” The main goal of  the independence movement now is “to bring the people of  Taiwan to  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identify themselves as a separate, self-ruling political community, while steadily but slowly reforming ROC 
institutions.”  178
	 The two independence movements can both be understood through its supporters’ concerns. 
While economic fears are one cause of  the Sunflower Movement in 2014, Taiwanese people mainly worry 
about their sovereignty. While Hong Kongese people have also expressed similar concerns, supporters of  
democracy and independence also wish for a politically separate government that practices political 
tolerance. Hong Kong’s independence supporters frame their movement as a “movement propelling the 
pace and scope of  democratization in the Hong Kong Special Administration Region,” while Taiwanese 
people mainly frame themselves as being “de facto independent.” Taiwanese people aim to protect their 
way of  life, but people in Hong Kong hope for a vote on independence in the future. Hong Kongese 
people, as well as Taiwanese people, have felt a disconnect towards their mainland ancestors. In both 
cases, identity is described as something culturally distinct from mainland China’s. Hong Kongese and 
Taiwanese have both shown a sense of  disconnect or superiority when it comes to thinking about 
mainland Chinese. 
	 As for levels of  “citizenship,” in Taiwan, my analysis indicates that, in 2010, Taiwanese people 
with higher social class are more proud to be Taiwanese. The cause of  this might be that those with 
higher social status may live a more comfortable life and therefore have a higher value of  “citizenship.” 
Another significant value is “Age over 50,” which supports my hypothesis that people over 50 will be more 
proud to be a citizen of  Taiwan. Qi also came to this conclusion in his research. The reason for this might 
be related to Taiwanese development, as Taiwan has become a more free and open society since the 
1980s. 
	 As for Hong Kongese people in 2012, my hypothesis that “males more than females will be proud 
to be a citizen of  China” is supported by the data, along with the hypothesis that “people over 50 will be 
more proud to be a citizen of  China.” Perhaps the reason why people over 50 are more proud to be a  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citizen is the fact that younger people have faced more economic problems after the British handover. The 
regression results prove that people with higher social status were more proud to be a citizen of  China. 
These people might benefit more from economic conditions caused by collaboration between Hong Kong 
and the mainland’s governments. 
	 Politics in Taiwan can be described as “movement-orientated.” The Taiwanese independence 
movement has succeeded in its establishment of  the DPP, by the party’s support of  the independence 
movement. Because of  the DPP and the support it provides to the movement, the idea of  Taiwanese 
independence has become widely familiarized and accepted in Taiwanese society. An example can be seen 
in the election data for Taiwan’s DPP. From 1986 to 1999 party membership increased by 180 percent, 
and from1999 to 2000, membership increased by over 170,000 people.  Additionally, after the recent 179
Sunflower Movement, new political parties formed in a wave called “3rd force politics,” as a reaction to 
closer economic ties with the People’s Republic of  China, advocated under the KMT government in 
2014. An example of  a new political party is the New Power Party, which advocates for total Taiwanese 
independence. 
	 In regards to political opportunity, the Taiwanese independence movement’s opportunity  for 
collective action has contracted on an international scale, but has expanded in Taiwan. For example, the 
Taiwanese independence movement was established in Taiwan after the Democratic Progressive Party was 
set up in 1986 as the opposing political party to the KMT and martial law was abolished in 1987. Political 
opportunity is already available in Taiwan by their government under DPP power; the government is part 
of  the movement, and the DPP is able to utilize support for Taiwanese independence for votes. However, 
outside of  Taiwan, political opportunity structure for Taiwanese independence has declined. The most 
distressing blow to the Taiwanese independence movement was in 1971, when the Republic of  China lost  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its seat in the U.N. As of  2016, only twenty-three countries maintain official diplomatic relations with the 
ROC.  180
	 Politics have changed in response to mainland China’s reaction to the Umbrella Movement. Jean-
Pierre Cabestan, an expert on Chinese politics at Hong Kong Baptist University, observed that Beijing’s 
“heavy-handed policy is just alienating more Hong Kongers and is actually the real reason of  the growing 
pro-independence sentiment.”  The “failure” of  the Umbrella Movement to produce results, as well as 181
mainland China’s reaction to the movement, led to the creation of  many new pro-independence or pro-
localist political parties. Martin Lee, a veteran activist and founder of  Hong Kong’s democratic party, 
reflected that the Umbrella Movement had created a new wave of  campaigners to take over from his 
generation. Lee stated this new wave shows that the Umbrella Movement “was successful because a lot of  
young people have participated in politics.”  The change in Hong Kongese politics can be an indicator 182
of  the movement’s success. 
	  As for political opportunity in Hong Kong, opportunity for protest formed after the Standing 
Committee of  National People’s Congress’ proposed electoral reform. Unwanted policies or reactions by 
the Chinese government has caused Hong Kong supporters to find other ways to express their concerns. 
Political opportunity fluctuated with protest policing and secret attempts by the Chinese government to 
stop protestors. As supporters for independence disagreed with the way in which the government reacted 
to their demands, the movement gain many supporters through the 2016 elections. By seeking positions in 
the legislative body, Hong Kongers have attempted to create political opportunity for themselves. 
	 Both of  the independence movements have now established some foundation in political parties. 
In Taiwan, the government with the DPP in power has been called a “movement government.”  In  183
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Hong Kong, some view supporters of  independence as radical, but they have been making efforts to form 
political institutions. Strategies for independence can be seen in how the protestors organized themselves 
to get elected to Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. 
	 In both places, identity and cultural productions have been used as protest strategy. Tactics in 
both places include film and social media. Han Chinese composes 92 percent of  Hong Kong’s 
population  and 95 percent of  Taiwan’s population.  While Hong Kongese and Taiwanese people both 184 185
share a common ancestry with people on the mainland, the way in which Hong Kongese people and 
Taiwanese people identify themselves has changed. When it comes to framing their movements, the 
Taiwanese and the Hong Kongese’s movement strategies can be described as purposely framed to contrast 
with mainland China. Independence supporters purposely address how they differ from the mainland 
Chinese. Especially in Hong, supporters of  independence have used social media to advocate their cause. 
In addition, media and film in Hong Kong, reflect the people’s desire for a more open government, as well 
as their concerns for the future. Supporters may also use local language as a protest element. 
	 The success of  the Taiwanese independence movement can be seen in the changes of  Taiwanese 
society in identity. An example can be seen in the legitimization of  the name Taiwan. Harrison discusses 
how the name Taiwan has become “legitimized by social groups through politics, literature and 
history.”  Politicians started to avoid having close relations with mainland Chinese. As mentioned before, 186
over time, ‘pro-China’ activities “became politically incorrect and none of  the politicians would like to 
receive such condemnation from their political rivals.”  On Blogspot, a post from Monday, March 9th, 187
2009 states, “Taiwan is Not [a] Part of  China. Period!!” The blogger states “the People’s Republic of   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China has never ruled Taiwan.”  This type of  information seems ingrained in Taiwanese society. In 188
Taiwan, calling oneself  Taiwanese has become in itself  a strategy of  protest. Calling oneself  Chinese in 
Taiwan may have begun to have negative implications. Taiwanese people have attempted to distinguish 
themselves from the KMT party and mainland Chinese.  
	 As for the success of  not only the independence movement, but the localist movement in Hong 
Kong, this can be seen specifically in the way that politics have changed. It can also be seen in the way 
that localists insist on an existing identity different from that of  mainland China’s. Politics in Hong Kong 
have also changed with the creation of  pro-independence political parties following the Umbrella 
Movement. Although the original movement failed, it became successful “because a lot of  young people 
have participated in politics.”  189
	 In conclusion, this thesis can add to the conversation about sovereignty and democracy in East 
Asia. When comparing both Taiwan and Hong Kong, reporters Forsythe and Ramzy state that “a fear of  
democracy and heavy-handed control of  the news are at odds with the increasingly well-educated” Hong 
Kong people, a “former British colony where civil liberties like freedom of  speech and freedom of  
assembly are guaranteed,” and Taiwan, “a democracy for the past two decades.”  Fernando Cheung, a 190
Hong Kongese lawmaker also makes the statement, ”If  Beijing doesn't change their tactics toward Hong 
Kong, there's a high chance that China will lose the hearts and minds of  Hong Kong people forever.” He 
adds, “And does that matter to Beijing? I think so. It would show to the world that China and its 
Communist Party cannot rule a highly developed economy and a cosmopolitan society like Hong 
Kong’s."  This thesis can further shed light to how the Chinese government should conduct relations 191
with both Taiwan and Hong Kong.  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	 Also interesting, however, is the recent travel ban on Taiwanese activists to Hong Kong.  During 192
the 2014 protests, Hong Kongers supported Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, while Taiwanese people 
supported Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement. 2014 photographs show Taiwanese people holding up signs 
such as “⾹香港，加油 [Go Hong Kong]!” and “Support Hong Kong Civil Disobedience Movement.” In 
Hong Kong, a sign of  support says, “I'm Hong Kongese. Taiwan, please step on our dead body and find 
your own path.” Meng-Lin Wu, a blogger in Taipei, comments, “China wants to annex Taiwan…If  
anything happens to Hong Kong due to China, then it will be considered a consequence for Taiwan too, 
should it become another SAR.”  If  the mainland government increases its suppression of  the Hong 193
Kongese movement through police protesting, or so on, it is likely that the mainland government will not 
only lose Hong Kong people’s support, but also will lose any possibility of  reconciliation with Taiwan.  
	 Authors of  Self, Identity and Social Movements state that “If  the generalized beliefs on which the 
movement is based represent an inaccurate assessment of  the political realities confronting the movement, 
it is only because they function on a psychological rather than political level.”  Based on numerous 194
articles describing Hong Kong and Taiwan’s independence movements as “unrealistic,” this statement can 
perhaps reflect the impossibilities of  Taiwanese and Hong Kongese independence. 
	 A suggestion for the Chinese government would be that it must listen to Hong Kong people’s 
concerns so that the People’s Republic of  China can have a better relationship with both Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, in the future. If  gaining Taiwan is still important to the People’s Republic of  China, then they 
must first win Hong Kong people’s hearts.  
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